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The paper examines Argentina’s economic expansion in the 1990s through the 
lens of a parsimonious neoclassical growth model. The main finding is that investment 
remained considerably weaker than what the model would have predicted. The resulting 
excessive “capital shallowing” could be identified as a weakness of the rapid economic 
growth of the 1990s that may have played a role in Argentina’s ultimate inability to 
escape the crisis that started to unfold towards the end of that decade.  
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  1   1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the heyday of its economic boom of the 1990s, Argentina was used to be 
proudly presented to the world as a living proof of the huge rewards that awaited all those 
emerging economies brave enough to implement free-market-oriented reforms as 
sweeping as the ones that country so diligently had carried out during that decade.  
Indeed, between 1990 and 1998 Argentina’s real GDP per capita grew at an 
average rate of 5% a year. This rapid growth, along with the far-reaching privatization 
and trade and financial liberalization program implemented in that same period, lit the 
hope that Argentina was leaving behind the economic stagnation of the previous “lost 
decade.” In this optmistic view, Argentina, like its neighbor Chile and the so-called Asian 
tigers before it, was heading full speed to convergence to the standards of living of 
developed countries. 
By the beginning of 2002 Argentina had not only lost its “success story” status 
but also become the world’s leading counterexample of what emerging economies ought 
not to do to move up in the development ladder. Borrowing the expression from Pastor 
and Wise (2001), How come Argentina went “from poster child to basket case” almost 
overnight? Such a sudden change of heart is not easy to justify by rigorous scientific 
standards and certainly raises the suspicion that the optimistic views about the prospects 
of Argentina’s economic growth often heard during the 1990s may have been formed on 
shaky grounds. At the very least, Argentina’s abrupt downgrading from success to failure 
suggests the need to reexamine its economic growth experience during those years with a 
more systematic approach. The purpose of this paper is to do precisely that through the 
lens of a parsimonious neoclassical growth model.  
  2   The main result of the paper is that an observer equipped with that model would 
have detected early on in the 1990s reasons to be skeptical about the prevailing 
enthusiasm about Argentina’s long run growth prospects. The worrisome sign for such an 
observer, our paper argues, would have been that capital accumulation did not show, 
during those years, nearly as much dynamism as a neoclassical growth model would have 
predicted in the face of the startling measured total-factor-productivity gains that 
Argentina’s economy was experiencing.  
In particular, between the end of the lost decade in 1989, and 1997, the capital 
stock was virtually unchanged, while the model predicts that it should have grown by at 
least 20 %. Put differently, such an observer would have verified that capital 
accumulation in the 1990s wasn’t being as dynamic as “advertised,” at least according to 
the frictionless world of a neoclassical model economy. This hint at the presence of 
considerable frictions in the capital accumulation process could have been exhibited by 
the skeptics as an early sign that not everything in Argentina was as fine as many seem to 
have believed at the time and that non-negligible growth risks might lie ahead. Indeed, 
the paper cannot dismiss the conjecture that the failure to identify and remove whatever 
frictions were responsible for the underperformance (relative to the model) of investment 
during the 1990s played a role in Argentina’s ultimate inability to escape repeated threats 
of financial meltdown, default, and devaluation, threats that finally materialized at the 




  3   2. OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
The booming 1990s were preceded in Argentina, as illustrated in Figure 1, by a 
protracted economic decline, the so-called “lost decade,” studied in detail in Kydland and 
Zarazaga (2002)-- KZ hereafter.
1 Given the performance during those lost-decade years, 
in which output per capita fell at an annual rate of 2.2 %, the seemingly stellar expansion 
of the 1990s would not appear as shocking to anyone familiar with neoclassical growth 
theory. After all, a neoclassical growth theorist unaware of the structural reforms that 
Argentina implemented in the first half of that decade would have failed to detect in that 
expansion any signs of those reforms and would have had no trouble in attributing all of 
it, in principle, to the typical strong recovery that theory would predict for any economy 
that has been drifting longer than usual below its long run path.  
Figure 1 would not be enough to dismiss that “bounce back effect” view, as the 
line representing GDP per capita detrended with the average growth for the period 1950-
97 shows indeed that by the end of the 1990s the economy had simply returned to trend. 
A somewhat more pessimistic picture emerges when actual GDP per capita is detrended 
by the average growth rate for the period 1950-79: by this measure, which completely 
excludes from trend the negative effects of the lost decade years, actual GDP per capita 
was still about 22 % below trend. 
However, a neoclassical growth theorist would have indeed been puzzled by some 
of the figures in Table 1, which reports the results of a standard growth accounting 
exercise with the production function represented in its “intensive” (per capita) form. 
                                                 
1 See the seminal work by Elías (1992) for the period 1950-80. 
  4   To be precise, throughout this paper it is assumed that the production function has 
the form:  
θ θ − =
1
t t t t L K A Y         ( 1 )  
where Y is aggregate output, A is total factor productivity (TFP), K is aggregate capital, 
and L is employment, measured in terms of hours at work.
2  After dividing both sides by 
total population, Nt, and some algebra, it is possible to decompose output per capita into 
three factors: the TFP factor  , labor intensity (L) and the capital intensity factor 
. This decomposition in per capita terms, rather than in absolute terms, is 
convenient because the growth rate of the efficiency factor coincides with the trend 
growth rate of output per capita when employment per capita and capital intensity are 
constant.
) 1 /( 1 θ − A
) 1 /( ) / (
θ θ − Y K
3 
For the purpose of this growth accounting exercise, as discussed in the section on 
the calibration procedure below, the capital cost share was set at 0.4.  
According to Table 1, GDP per capita during the lost decade declined at an annual 
rate of 2.3 percent. The TFP factor accounted for almost all of this decline. By contrast, 
the TFP factor experienced a big surge of almost 7% in the 1990s. In this case, 
information about the structural reforms introduced over the period would have been 
relevant to a neoclassical growth theorist who could otherwise be puzzled by the 
magnitude of those productivity gains.  
However, another figure of Table 1 would have called his attention: the fact that 
the excess of TFP growth over GDP growth was compensated by a fairly large decline in 
                                                 
2 Capital input corresponds to the capital stock in place by the end of the previous period, rather than of the 
current one, as in KZ . This different timing, along with updated GDP and employment series, accounts for 
the differences between the figures in Table 1 of this paper and the same table of that other paper. 
3 For details, see Kehoe and Prescott (2002.) 
  5   the capital-output ratio. This feature of the data would have led him naturally to wonder 
whether the extent of such “capital shallowing” was consistent with productivity gains of 
the magnitude observed in that same period. The goal of the quantitative exercise in the 
next section is to answer precisely this question. 
 
3. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK  
Model 
  In this paper we examine the growth performance in the 1990s through the lens of 
the same stochastic neoclassical growth model as that studied in KZ, briefly summarized 
here for convenience. 
  Household preferences can be represented by: 




σ α α − − +
− −
∞
= ∑ t t
t
t
t l c E Max     (2) 
where ct  represents consumption, lt  hours of work, α is a preferences share parameter that 
determines the fraction of utility originating in consumption and leisure, η the population 
growth rate, and σ  the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion.  
  Technology is described by 
θ θ γ
− + = +
1 ] ) 1 [( t
t
t t t t l k z x c      (3) 
t t t k k x ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 δ η γ − − + + = +     (4) 
ε ρ t zt zt + = +1       ( 5 )  
 
where kt is the capital stock, xt is investment, θ the labor input share in national income, 
and zt a stochastic, stationary, exogenous technological shock, where the innovation εt is 
  6   assumed to be an i.i.d. process with mean zero and standard deviation 1/(1-ρ). As should 
be apparent from the notation, the model assumes labor augmenting technological 
progress at the rate γ. On the balanced growth path of this model economy, output, 
consumption and capital grow at the rate (1 + η) (1 + γ). 
 
Calibration  
Following the approach described in Cooley and Prescott (1995), the model 
economy was calibrated by choosing parameters so that the balanced growth path of the 
model matches certain steady-state features of Argentina’s economy. With the exception 
of the persistence parameter ρ, the parameter values reported in Table 2 are the same as 
in KZ, where the readers can find a more thorough justification for the choices of those 
values, as well as a detailed discussion of the sources of the data and methodology 
followed in the construction of all the series, such as the capital stock, involved in the 
estimation of the TFP (or Solow residual.)  
In setting the persistence parameter ρ, the autoregressive component of the total 
factor productivity process, we follow the same procedure as in KZ. That is, we set ρ to 
the value of the point estimate of the coefficient from an autoregression on detrended 
Solow residuals (TFP.) However, for the purpose of robustness check in this paper, we 
explore the quantitative effects of detrending the Solow residuals by the average TFP 
growth rate in two different periods: 1950-79, and alternatively, 1950-97, rather than 
1950-70 as in KZ. As reported in Table 2, the resulting ρ for the first period was 0.7553 
while for the second it was 0.8423.  
  7    
Computation 
The numerical experiments below report the allocations that a social planner 
maximizing the welfare of a representative household would pick in our artificial 
economy. Technically, this social planner problem was solved with the by now standard 
linear quadratic approach pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1982). As is well known, 
under standards assumption that are satisfied in this paper, the social planner’s preferred 
allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium in which households 
maximize their welfare and firms their profits. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTS  
Purpose 
  The purpose of this section is to address the question that the imaginary 
neoclassical growth theorist in the introduction might ask when confronted with Table 1. 
That is, Did the capital stock and employment in the 1990s behave as predicted by a 
neoclassical growth model in which TFP is taken as exogenous and no other exogenous 
factors change? In particular, would the “capital shallowing” observed during the 1990s 
stand as an anomaly from the perspective of a parsimonious neoclassical growth model? 
To that end, we simulate the model by feeding the measured TFP into the competitive 
equilibrium (or social planner’s) decision rules, after having set the initial capital stock at 
the value (detrended) that it had at the end of 1989.  
For the purpose of comparing the outcomes generated by the model with the actual 
data, it is important to point out that the numerical experiments were carried out under the 
  8   assumption that the artificial economy does not exhibit any long-run growth. That is, with 
η = 0 and γ = 0. As in KZ, based in turn in the findings reported by Hansen (1997,) the 
appropriate comparison of the outcomes of the model with the data requires to detrend 




  As more fully discussed in KZ, for the purposes of detrending there is some 
uncertainty about the long run growth features of Argentina’s economy. In particular, as 
inspection of Figure 1 should make apparent, it is unclear whether the lost decade of the 
1980s should be considered a normal occurrence along Argentina’s long run growth path, 
or rather, a rare occurrence that should not be taken into consideration at the time of 
assessing the long run growth trend (or “potential output”) of that economy. 
To take into account this uncertainty about the “true” trends, the outcomes from 
the numerical experiments are compared with the data detrended with the relevant 
average growth rates for two different periods: 1950-79, and 1950-97. 
Thus, for example, the capital stock for the first numerical experiment was 
detrended assuming long run population and TFP factor annual growth rates of, 
respectively, 1.71% and 0.92%, the same as the average annual growth rates of those 
variables during the period 1950-79 reported in Table 1.  The corresponding detrending 
rates for the second experiment were 1.54% and 1.02%. Since along a balanced growth 
path employment should increase at the same rate as population, the employment series 
  9   were detrended by 1.71% and 1.54% for the comparisons with the first and second 
experiment, respectively. 
As the above figures should make clear, the differences in the average TFP factor 
growth rates between the two benchmark periods were minimal, suggesting that the 
unusually large productivity gains of the 1990s more than compensated for the unusually 
heavy productivity losses of the 1980s. Accordingly, any differences between the first 
experiment (detrending by 1950-79 averages) and second experiment (detrending with 
1950-97 averages) can be attributed mainly to differences in the population growth rates. 
The results of the numerical experiments are reported in Figures 2 through 7.  
Figures 2 through 4 compare the outcomes of our “no growth” artificial economy 
with the data detrended by the relevant 1950-79 average growth rates. As is apparent 
from Figures 2 and 3, the model economy overestimates labor and capital input. The 
overestimation of the latter is particularly important: while according to the model the 
capital stock should have been about 25% larger by the end of the 1990s than in 1989, it 
merely came back to its 1989 level according to the data. As a result, the extent of the 
“capital shallowing” observed in the 1990s was much more pronounced than what the 
neoclassical growth model would have predicted (Figure 4.) In particular, while, 
according to the model, by the end of the 1990s the capital-output ratio should have been 
only 10% below its long run (steady-state) value, in the data it was by then almost a 
fourth below its steady state value.
4 
                                                 
4 Some “capital shallowing” is not inconsistent with the predictions of a neoclassical growth model, as 
above trend TFP realizations may induce such an increase in employment (and output) in order to take 
advantage of the particularly “good times” to save and accumulate capital, that the capital-output ratio may 
initially decline and start rising to its long run value only later, when the unusually good TFP realizations 
subside. 
  10    As should be clear from Figure 5, the overestimation of capital input is a feature 
of the model that is robust to the choice of long run trend. In particular, as was the case 
when detrending by 1950-79 averages, the capital stock does not show much change 
between 1997 and 1989 when detrended by the relevant average growth rates for the 
period 1950-97 either. Yet, according to the model the capital stock in 1997 should have 
been 20 % larger than in 1989. In correspondence with this result, the process of “capital 
shallowing” was, again, much more pronounced in the 1990s than what the model would 
have predicted. (Figure 7.) 
The choice of trend, however, does make a difference for labor input. As is 
apparent from comparing Figure 3 with Figure 6, the predictions of the model are much 
more in line with the employment data when they are detrended by the average 
population growth rate in the period 1950-97 than when they are detrended with the 
corresponding 1950-79 average. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  This paper has examined the economic expansion that Argentina experienced 
during the 1990s through the lens of a very parsimonious neoclassical growth model. The 
main finding is that investment remained much weaker than what the model would have 
predicted. This result seems to be robust to different conjectures about the underlying 
trend growth rates, be they the ones observed for the period 1950-70, as reported in KZ, 
or for the periods 1950-79 and 1950-97 used for this paper. 
  A similar anomaly for the 1980s reported in KZ could be used to dismiss the 
relevance of the model for analyzing Argentina’s growth experience in the last two 
  11    decades. However, as also pointed out in KZ, an open economy version of the 
parsimonious neoclassical growth model used there and here could still account for the 
1980s. The reason is that the productivity decline observed in the lost decade would 
induce much larger capital outflows in that open economy model than in the closed 
economy model considered here. As a result, the model would predict lower investment 
than it does now and would produce, therefore, predictions eventually more in line with 
the data.  
However, those same open economy features are likely to enlarge, rather than 
reduce, the overestimation of investment in the model during the expansion of the 1990s. 
The reason would be that for that period the productivity surge would induce large capital 
inflows and, therefore, an investment even higher than in the current closed economy 
version of the model. 
Given that intuition, it seems fair to conjecture that an open economy model could 
correct the overestimation of investment during the 1980s but increase it during the 
1990s. In other words, the open economy model would corroborate the finding in this 
closed economy model that investment during the 1990s did not grow as much as it 
should have. This discrepancy suggests the presence of considerable frictions to the 
capital accumulation process that were particularly noticeable during the 1990s. Such a 
result is not totally unexpected. In fact, a growing body of literature inspired by Alvarez 
and Jermann (1998) suggests that small open economies face borrowing constraints that 
are binding not during downturns, as intuition might suggest, but during expansions (see, 
for example, Kehoe and Perri (2000).) The reason is that lenders do not have much 
interest anyway in investing in a country undergoing a period of low or declining 
  12    productivity growth. Absent the possibility of default, however, the same foreign lenders 
would like to invest a lot during a period of high productivity growth. However, if they 
refrain from doing so as much as they would in a world without default, it is precisely 
because they realize that it is at good times, when it has plenty of capital, that a country 
will have the highest incentives to renege on its debt payments. If this conjecture were to 
be confirmed more formally, a possible explanation of why investment remained so weak 
(relative to the model) in Argentina during the 1990s is that investors still had fresh in 
their memories that country’s sovereign debt default in the mid 1980s and confiscation of 
deposits in 1990. By the same token, the new confiscation of deposits in 2001 and default 
in 2002 would harbinger that a new lost decade lies ahead for Argentina.  
Whether an open economy model that incorporates the possibility of default will 
be able to resolve the “capital shallowing” anomaly of the 1990s uncovered in this paper 
is a challenging open question that should stimulate much needed and exciting research 
efforts. 
 
  13    Table 1 
Accounting for Growth: 
 
Time period  Factor 
 
 
GDP per capita 




1979-1990  -2.22 %  -2.61 %    0.19 %  0.22 % 







































  For experiment detrending 
with averages in period: 
Time Period  1950-79  1950-97 
 
γ (productivity factor) 
 
0.92 %  1.02 % 
 
η (population growth) 
 
1.71 %  1.54 % 
 
Technology level in 1989 
 
0.8083  0.8007 
 




ρ (shock persistence) 
 
0.7553 0.8423 



























  15    Figure 1
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Perfect foresight, "Japanese" preferences 
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